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Abstract
In the context of population ageing and low retirement incomes, the UK government is
encouraging delayed retirement. However, the OECD has argued that UK means-tested benefits
disincentivise employment for the poorest, and Vickerstaff (2006b) has suggested managers
have typically controlled opportunities to work beyond 65. In the US, contrastingly, benefits
are meagre and difficult to access, and age discrimination legislation protects individuals from
forced retirement. Would a US ‘self-reliance’ policy approach increase employment amongst
the poorest over 65s in the UK and enhance or diminish their financial position? The evidence
suggests that extending UK age discrimination legislation and restricting benefits would increase
overall employment past 65, although not necessarily to US levels. Analysis of the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing and the US Health and Retirement Study finds the poorest over
65s were more likely to work in the USA than in England in 2002. However, within the USA,
employment amongst the poorest was still low, especially compared with wealthier groups;
logistic regression analysis primarily attributes this to lower levels of health and education. A
US policy approach would therefore most likely damage the financial position of the poorest
in the UK, as increased employment would not sufficiently compensate for lost benefits.
Introduction
Across industrialised countries concern is growing about the future costs of
supporting growing numbers of older people (OECD, 2006c). Many countries
are attempting to increase the percentage of pre-retirement age people in
employment to offset some of the costs (Ebbinghaus, 2006). Furthermore, people
will have to wait longer to receive a state pension in countries such as the UK,
where the state pension age at the current time is set to rise from 65 to 68
between 2024 and 2046 at the latest. In the lead up to this, the UK government
has increasingly sought to encourage people to work longer (Vickerstaff, 2006b)
and delay taking their state pension(s).
But has it been realistic to expect those in most financial need of earnings
to work past their mid sixties? This question is particularly pertinent to the UK
because employment rights for men and women are, at the time of writing,
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negligible after age 65 (Lain, 2009; EC, 2002). Qualitative research by Sarah
Vickerstaff and her colleagues (Vickerstaff et al., 2003; Vickerstaff, 2006a, 2006b)
has suggested that UK employees have not had the degree of choice over
retirement timing assumed by policy; instead, line managers have often decided
whether individuals will be allowed to work beyond 65, based on the perceived
needs of the department (see also Flynn, 2010). Furthermore, the OECD (2006a:
74) argues that means-tested benefits, that are lost as a result of working, mean that
‘delaying retirement is a significantly less attractive option [for poorer people]’.
American policy might be viewed as offering solutions to these potential
barriers to employment. In the US, access to means-tested benefits has been
severely restricted, limiting employment disincentives for the poorest (Lain,
2009). At the same time, US age discrimination legislation without an upper
age limit formally protects people from forced retirement, in principle enabling
individuals to delay retirement until they have sufficient resources to stop
working. The UK’s former Labour government had strongly hinted that it would
follow the US path of outlawing mandatory retirement ages (DWP, 2009: 9); with
a new coalition government, it seems increasingly likely at the time of writing that
this will happen, the rationale being that it will promote economic independence
and choice (BIS, 2010). In this context, it is not inconceivable that questions will
also be raised in some quarters about the desirability of providing means-tested
benefits that potentially discourage employment.
This paper therefore examines whether adopting a US policy approach in
the UK would increase employment of the poorest over 65s and enhance their
overall financial position. Using the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA)
and US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we examine how wealth influences
employment, and how this influence is mediated by differences in health and
education. We focus on the year 2002 because men and women in both countries
had access to a ‘normal’ state pension at 65; after this date Americans had to wait
longer.1 We conclude by arguing that extending age discrimination legislation
and reducing access to state benefits in the UK would increase the number of
over 65s in employment, but damage the financial position of the poorest as a
group.
The institutional context of employment past age 65
We might expect employment past 65 to be similarly high in the UK and the
USA: both are commonly classified as having weakly decommodifying ‘liberal’
welfare states, in which people are reliant to a significant degree on the labour
market for meeting their welfare needs (following Esping-Andersen, 1990). At
the same time, both are said to have comparatively unregulated liberal market
economies (cf. Hall and Soskice, 2001) in which employers should have a high
degree of latitude over employment decisions. However, a number of authors
have questioned the liberal label. Castles and Mitchell (1993), for example, argue
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that whilst the USA might be categorised as ‘liberal’, the UK, Australia and New
Zealand are too egalitarian for this category. Further, O’Connor et al. (1999)
argue that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology ignores the different gendered
policy assumptions, or ‘policy logics’, found across English-speaking ‘liberal’
countries.
The present author has also argued that different US and UK ‘policy logics’
underpinned social and employment policy for older people in the early 2000s
(Lain, 2009). A US policy logic of self-reliance was based on the expectation that
older people should time their retirement according to their financial needs. The
state’s role was not to provide an adequate safety net, but to formally protect
the employment of older people until they were in the financial position to leave
work.
In the UK, we can identify a policy logic of ‘paternalism’ in the early 2000s
(Lain, 2009). This policy logic assumed older people were a more vulnerable
group, who were not expected to secure their welfare through employment. The
role of the state was not, therefore, to formally protect the employment of those
aged 65 and over, but to provide a financial safety net aimed at preventing poverty.
A political rhetoric of individual responsibility has developed in the UK that
is somewhat at odds with this paternalistic policy logic. This will be reflected in
the proposed introduction of the National Employment Savings Trust, the new
name for Personal Accounts that are anticipated to encourage retirement saving
amongst modest and low earners (DWP, 2006). Future generations will bear
increasing financial risk with regard to pensions, given the shift occurring from
defined benefit to defined contribution pensions (Bridgen and Meyer, 2005).
Nevertheless, for older people reaching 65 in 2010 the basic parameters of the UK
policy are fundamentally the same as in the early 2000s, particularly with regard
to areas of potential importance to poorer people: means-tested benefits and age
discrimination legislation.
Means-tested benefits
In neither the UK nor the US is state pension provision generous by
international standards, particularly for those with formerly low earnings
(Whitehouse, 2003: 35). According to Whitehouse (2003: 35), someone with a
full contributions record earning half average earnings throughout their life
would receive state pensions equivalent to 25 per cent of average earnings in the
UK, and 29 per cent of average earnings in the USA. (This includes the Social
Security pension in the US, and the Basic State Pension and State Earnings Related
Pension in the UK.2)
When one considers that breaks in employment can dramatically reduce
pension levels, and in the UK very low earnings do not contribute towards pension
income (Ginn, 2003), it is obvious that means-tested benefits have a potentially
important role in preventing individuals falling below subsistence levels. Given
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the greater emphasis on providing a financial safety net, means-tested benefits
in the UK were easier to receive, more generous, and more widespread in the
early 2000s (Lain, 2009). The need for means-tested provision will also continue
into the future: the government has estimated that a third of pensioners will be
entitled to means-tested benefits in 2050 (Bridgen and Meyer, 2007: 69; see also
Price, 2007).
Both countries provided means-tested ‘income assistance’ benefits in 2002,
guaranteeing minimum incomes for older people (the UK Minimum Income
Guarantee and US Supplemental Security Income). However, the percentage of
over 65s receiving income assistance was lower in the USA than the UK in the early
2000s, at around 3 per cent for those living alone or as a couple, compared with 12
per cent in the UK (Lain, 2009: 146).3 Partly this was because US politicians had
marginalised the benefit to only the very poorest, by failing to uprate the amount
of assets recipients were allowed to have. In 2002, recipients were allowed assets
of around $2,000 excluding housing (SSA, 2003b: 2), the same amount as in 1989,
and in real terms only 37 per cent of the amount allowed in 1974 (Elder and
Powers, 2006: 343). This compares with £12,000 of non-housing assets allowable
in the UK (McConaghy et al., 2003: 2).
Income assistance in the UK was also slightly more generous, guaranteeing
a single pensioner an income equivalent to 26 per cent of average earnings,
compared with 20 per cent in the USA scheme.4 Likewise, couples in the UK
could receive income assistance equivalent to 40 per cent of average earnings,
compared with 31 per cent in the USA.5 In 23 out of the 52 states in the USA,
supplements increased income assistance levels, but typically by a trivial amount:
the median supplement was only $31 a month for an unmarried person (US
Committee on Ways and Means, 2004: 3–28–3–29, Table 3–5).
We can see a similar, if more extreme, difference between the countries in
terms of the generosity and availability of housing benefits. In the UK, Housing
Benefit had a simple rationale: to ensure that no one in rented accommodation
had an income of less than income assistance, once reasonable rental costs had
been deducted (Priemus et al., 2005: 587). For those aged over 60, this therefore
meant that a person receiving income assistance in rented accommodation
received a benefit equivalent to their full rental costs (assuming rental levels
were deemed reasonable; see Zebedee and Ward, 2002). The benefit was received
as of right, as long as the income and asset conditions were met, and could be
used for private or public sector rented accommodation.
In the USA, housing assistance was a much more fragmented system, split
between vouchers for private sector accommodation, and low-rent housing
programmes (OECD, 2004b: 5). Nevertheless, the common principle was that
recipients had to contribute 30 per cent of their income, minus some deductions,
to the rent; this strongly weakened the generosity of the benefit (Lain, 2009).
In addition, housing assistance in the USA was a budgeted scheme, and the
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number of ‘places’ available severely restricted by budget constraints and the
limited stock of suitable rental accommodation (OECD, 2004b; Priemus et al.,
2005). In order to apply, individuals had to join queues for housing assistance that
could last for many years (Priemus et al., 2005: 592). Once individuals reached
the front of the queue, they were given 60 to 120 days to find a home within
the allowed price range meeting the required quality standards. Failure to find
such accommodation ranged from 30 to 50 per cent across different metropolitan
areas (ibid.: 582). As a result, whereas just under fifth of people over 65 living
alone or in couples received housing assistance in the UK, in the USA it was a
twentieth (Lain, 2009: 146).6 Three quarters of housing vouchers went to the very
poor (30 per cent of median income; OECD, 2004b: 5). However, in 1999 only ‘29
per cent of extremely low and very low income renter households were receiving
a housing subsidy’ (Priemus et al., 2005: 582).
As noted in the introduction, the OECD (2006a) argues that means-tested
benefits in the UK disincentivise continued employment; the evidence provides
some support for this assessment. For single people over 65 in 2002, median
means-tested benefits received totalled £54 per week (DWP, 2004: 33). With the
exception of £5 earnings disregards (OECD, 2004a), these benefits would be
lost entirely as a result of earning a wage of £54 or above. Given the difficulty of
obtaining means-tested benefits in the US, on the other hand, it is interesting that
the OECD (2006b) does not deem it necessary to discuss means-tested benefits
in its analysis of financial incentives to retire.
Age discrimination legislation
With very modest state pensions for low earners, and access to means-tested
benefits severely restricted, policy in the USA in the last 25 years has arguably
been one of encouraging older people to time their retirements according to
their financial needs. As a formal means to do this, the upper age limit on
US age discrimination legislation was lifted in 1986. This built on the 1967 Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which ‘prohibit(ed) arbitrary age
discrimination in employment’ between the ages of 40 and 65 (Neumark, 2003:
298), and an ADEA amendment extending coverage up to age 70 from 1978.
By 1978, 15 US states had already introduced their own age discrimination
legislation without upper age limits (Neumark and Stock, 1999: 1090–1101).
However, the 1986 ADEA amendment was significant in forbidding employers
across the US from using mandatory retirement ages for all but a few occupations
where safety was an issue.7 Enforcement is overseen by the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission, and employers found to have discriminated on the
basis of age potentially face having to reinstate or hire the individual(s) involved,
and pay legal costs and damages (which may be punitively high) (Neumark, 2003:
300).
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According to Macnicol (2006: 255), the under secretary of Labor, Malcolm
R. Lovell, made three justifications for the 1986 amendment:
older workers who remained in employment would contribute to Social Security, that income
from work was better than an inadequate pension, and that technological advances made the
labour process less physically demanding.
Formal rights to continued employment were therefore legislated as a remedy to
pensions that the government acknowledged could be inadequate. To ensure that
continued work results in increased retirement incomes, an amendment to the
ADEA further requires that employers provide ‘continued contributions, credits
and accruals under pension plans for service beyond normal retirement age [i.e.
beyond age 65]’ (Quadagno and Hardy, 1991: 473).
The situation in the UK in the early 2000s was very different to the US, as there
was no age discrimination legislation (Macnicol, 2006). Employees had no right
to continue working past age 65, and very limited rights to claim unfair dismissal
or redundancy payments after this age (EC, 2002). Age discrimination legislation
was passed in October 2006, but only gives individuals the opportunity to request
continued employment past age 65 (Sergeant, 2006: 226); recent research by Flynn
(2010) suggests this has done little to change the dominance of line managers
in decisions about continued employment. Clearly, the UK has operated under
a very different set of assumptions to the US about the potential role of older
people as workers and earners.
Comparing employment by wealth and human capital: what we know
With limited access to state benefits but greater potential opportunity to
work, we would expect the poorest Americans to be much more likely to work than
their British counterparts. However, it is not possible to draw a firm conclusion
on this from the literature, which makes it difficult to assess the possible impact
of adopting US policies in the UK. The body of research on workers past typical
retirement age is comparatively small for both countries (Smeaton and McKay,
2003: 5; McNamara and Williamson, 2004: 259) and has led to some mixed
impressions about the financial position of these workers. For example, Smeaton
and McKay (2003) perform logistic regression analysis on the factors associated
with working past state pension age in the UK, and conclude:
Working [past state pension age] is associated with financial hardship such as: the absence
of an occupational pension, income below £100 for men, still paying a mortgage and, for
women, being separated or divorced . . . [However] Those in more extreme need with very
low savings have often experienced a lifetime of disadvantage with attenuated employment
opportunities leading to reliance upon state benefits, which in turn can function as an
employment disincentive.
With the exception of those in most extreme need, working past state pension
age is therefore said to be most commonly associated with financial disadvantage.
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However, it may be the case that the employment amongst wealthier individuals
is not entirely captured, because of the primary focus on income received, not
wealth held. For example, ‘absence of an occupational pension’ refers to receipt
of occupational pension income, and many workers over 65 will have postponed
pensions until retirement; indeed, it was not legally possible to draw a pension
from a current employer unless you had pension rights dating back before 1989
(Meadows, 2003: 31). Likewise, ‘income’ refers to non-earnings income, which is
likely to be low for workers who have deferred their occupational, personal or
state pension.
Parries and Sommers (1994) also find that working in older age is associated
with low levels of non-wage income in the US. Haider and Loughran (2001), on
the other hand, find that: ‘labour supply [in the USA] is concentrated among
the most educated, wealthiest and healthiest elderly’ (ibid. from the abstract).
This conclusion is drawn on the basis of wealth rather than non-wage income,
which avoids the problem of pension deferral found in other studies. Closer
inspection of Haider and Loughran’s (2001) results suggests that employment
was not concentrated amongst the wealthiest, however, in the sense that it was
confined predominantly to the wealthiest strata. Smeaton and McKay’s (2003)
UK analysis further shows that those with low savings were less likely to work.
Without comparable cross-country studies, however, it is difficult to compare
the role of wealth on employment between the countries.
Research has emphasised the fact that people are likely to work past state
pension age for a range of reasons beyond the financial (Barnes et al., 2004; Tanner,
1997; Parries and Sommers, 1994; Parry and Taylor, 2007), so it is perhaps unwise
to assume that older workers are concentrated at either the top or bottom of the
economic hierarchy. However, poorer Americans should be more likely to work
than their English counterparts given the nature of American policy; whether or
not this is the case may depend on the degree to which levels of education and
health limit employment. Studies from the UK and USA have consistently found
that, compared with the economically inactive, workers past typical retirement
age are likely to be healthier and better educated on average (Smeaton and McKay,
2003; Parries and Sommers, 1994; McNamara and Williamson, 2004; Haider and
Loughran, 2001). Consequently, poorer older people with low levels of education
and health may find it particularly difficult to compete for or retain employment.
This is partly because of their lower range of work capabilities, but also because
they are likely to be confined to precarious jobs at earlier ages.
In order to investigate the influence of wealth on employment, and how this
is mediated through levels of health and education, we present analyses of the
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and US Health and Retirement
Study (HRS).
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Data
ELSA was designed in conjunction with the HRS, and consequently the surveys
have ‘comparable measures of health, income, and education’ (Banks et al., 2006:
2037), as well as wealth. The surveys interview people in their fifties upwards
alongside their partners; this included large samples of people aged 65 and over
in 2002 (5,538 in England and 10,428 in the USA). Because we focus on 2002,
the first year of the ELSA survey, our analysis here is cross-sectional (in any
case, longitudinal analysis using the three subsequent waves of data would be
limited by the small number of movements into and out employment for the
over 65s). We use cross-sectional weights provided with the surveys with the aim
of ensuring the results are representative of the populations being examined.
For the USA, the analysis in this paper has been conducted using the Rand
HRS Version F file, which has been constructed by the Rand organisation from
the raw HRS data files (see St Clair et al., 2006). The Rand Organisation have
cleaned and processed the data, as well as performing a considerable amount of
wealth and income imputation (see ibid.: 2), as was also performed for ELSA (see
ELSA, n.d.). The ELSA results should broadly reflect the UK situation, because
the vast majority of the population live in England.8
The influence of wealth on employment: policy lessons from the USA?
Table 1 shows employment rates by wealth level based on ELSA and HRS. The
surveys identified employment by asking whether the individual was doing any
paid work or was self-employed currently (in the USA) or in the previous month
(for the UK) (see Lain, 2009: 80–1).9 Wealth is presented at the individual level,
and relates to assets – for example, property, businesses, savings and investments
(but excludes pension assets).10 If a person lived with a partner, their combined
wealth was equivalised to the individual level using the ‘OECD-modified scale’
(OECD, n.d.; see also Atkinson et al., 1995), which assumes a couple needs 1.5
times the income or wealth of a single person to have an equivalent standard
of living. Quintiles were calculated from the equivalised wealth for those aged
65-plus.
The results for ‘wealth excluding pensions’ show that in both countries the
richest were most likely to work (20.7 per cent in the USA, 11.5 per cent in the UK).
In England, employment rates fell as wealth decreased, with only 2.7 per cent of
the poorest quintile working. In contrast, in the USA employment rates across
the middle three quintiles were fairly similar (17.4–18.9 per cent). Nevertheless,
as in the UK, the poorest in the USA were by far the least likely to work (12.7 per
cent). When we exclude housing wealth, which might exaggerate the financial
prosperity of some individuals, we still see low levels of employment for the
poorest (see Table 1, panel B).
The higher rates of employment at all wealth levels in the US suggest US
policies would increase employment in the UK, although ironically to lower levels
encouraging employment past 65 in england and the usa 501
Table 1. The percentages of those aged 65-plus in
employment by equivilised wealth quintiles: England
and USA, 2002
(A) All wealth excluding pensions
England USA
1st quintile 11.5 21.7
2nd quintile 8.5 17.7
3rd quintile 6.1 18.9
4th quintile 5.2 17.4
5th quintile 2.7 12.6
Total 6.8 17.7
Base 5,508 10,392
(B) All non-housing wealth excluding pensions
England USA
1st quintile 11.9 20.7
2nd quintile 6.4 18.9
3rd quintile 7.7 19.2
4th quintile 3.2 19.3
5th quintile 4.6 10.3
Total 6.8 17.7
Base 5,508 10,392
Note: Differences between countries were statistically
significant at the p = >0.001 level, in the percentages employed
at each level of wealth (Panels A and B).
Note: Wealth equivilised to the individual level.
Source: Author’s analysis of the English Longitudinal Study of
Ageing 2002, and the Health and Retirement Study 2002 (Rand
Version F file).
for the poorest. However, to what extent does the broader evidence corroborate
that US policies would increase overall employment? Figure 1 shows that in the
mid 1960s around a quarter of men11 worked past 65 in both countries (23.7 per
cent in the UK and 26.7 per cent in the USA). During the period, employment
fell in both countries, as we would expect given that over 65s became older
and wealthier on average and unemployment rose above the very low levels
experienced in the earlier post-war years. However, the decline was smaller in
the US, suggesting that age discrimination legislation did have an impact. Some
of the divergence in employment between countries occurred before 1978 when
the ADEA was extended to the age of 70. However, the 15 US states introducing
age discrimination legislation without an upper age limit before 1978 contained
37 per cent of the US population aged 65 and over.12 It is therefore reasonable
to conclude that state-based legislation played a part in stemming the decline in
employment past 65 in the US during this period.
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Figure 1. Employment rates of men aged 65-plus: UK and USA, 1965–2008
Source: Data retrieved from http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ALFS_SUMTAB#
(08/09/09), and OECD (1986) prior to 1984.
Other research also suggests that US age discrimination legislation had a
positive impact on employment, but in relation to the retention rather than
recruitment of older workers (Adams, 2004; Neumark and Stock, 1999; Issacharoff
and Harris, 1997). For example, Adams (2004: 240) examines how variations in
age discrimination legislation across US states influenced employment in the
1960s; he concludes that ‘age discrimination legislation has succeeded at boosting
the employment of older individuals through allowing them to remain in the
workforce longer’. However, the likelihood of finding work past 65 was reduced
if they were covered by age discrimination legislation (ibid., 236). We cannot
automatically infer that US policies would reduce recruitment of over 65s in the
UK, given that US employees are more likely than their British counterparts to be
in jobs started after 65 (Lain, 2009: 202). Nevertheless, from a policy perspective,
there is little evidence that US policies will not automatically open up employment
opportunities for those seeking work past age 65.
The primary impact of the legislation is therefore likely to be the way in which
it prevents employers from organising employment exit around fixed retirement
ages, whilst at the same time enhancing people’s expectations of, and claims to,
continued employment. However, while we may have good reason to assume US
policies would increase employment in the UK, we cannot assume this will be
to the levels found in the US. Wider factors, such as labour market conditions
and financial incentives, contributed to the higher rate of employment in the
US in the early 2000s. Unemployment levels13 and the sectoral composition of
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employment were similar in both countries in the early 2000s.14 In addition, male
employment rates diverged in the period up to 1981 when unemployment levels
were similar in both countries.15 However, a tighter US labour market in the years
leading up to 2002 probably contributed to the higher level of US employment
at that time (Lain, 2009).
By the early 2000s, it is also evident that some of the gap in employment past
65 could be attributed to differences in financial incentives to work. Americans
were better off on average (Disney and Whitehouse, 2002: 3) and actuarial
adjustments for late receipt of state pensions were identical in both countries
(OECD, 2001: 156). However, salary-related occupational pensions were more
common in the UK than US (Ashcroft, 2009), and this may have discouraged
employment in situations where employers ceased contributions at 65 but forced
employees to wait until retirement for their pension (Meadows, 2003). It could
be argued that US age discrimination legislation, if applied to the UK, would
mandate employers to contribute to pensions until retirement, reducing this
disincentive effect on employment (see above). It could also be noted that, looking
into the future, final salary pensions are in decline in the UK too. Nevertheless,
in 2002 some of the increased employment in the US was probably attributable
to differences in pension incentives (Meadows, 2003).
In both countries, the poorest were unlikely to have salary-related
occupational pensions, so these disincentive effects are unlikely to have had much
effect for these individuals. However, despite the difficulty of obtaining benefit
or occupational pension income, and despite protection from forced retirement,
the number of poorer Americans working was low. Indeed, Table 1 shows that the
poorest were only around half as likely to work as the richest in the USA. If this
can be attributed to low levels of health and education, it would raise questions
about the ability of the poorest in the UK to secure or retain employment in
older age, even if protection from age discrimination was extended past 65 and
financial disincentives to work were reduced.
Logistic regression analysis
In order to investigate the degree to which education, health and age placed
restrictions on the ability of the poorest to work, we perform logistic regression
analysis (Table 2). The dependent variable is whether the individual aged 65-
plus is employed (a value of 1) or inactive (a value of 0). We use the following
independent variables:
• non-pension wealth quintile,
• number of health limitations,
• qualifications, and
• age in years.
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Table 2. Logistic regression analysis: wealth and human capital effects on the
probability of working past 65 in England and the USA, 2002 (odds ratios)
Model 1 Model 2
England USA England USA
Non-pension wealth quintile (ref = Quintile 1)
Quintile 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Quintile 2 0.72∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.86 0.85
Quintile 3 0.50∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.66∗ 1.00
Quintile 4 0.50∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.73 1.02
Quintile 5 0.27∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.82∗
Number of health limitations (ref = 0)
0 Limitations 1.00 1.00
1 Limitation 0.93 0.88∗∗
2 Limitations 0.67∗ 0.79∗∗∗
3 Limitations 0.51∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
4 Limitations 0.30∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
5 Limitations 0.21∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
6 Limitations 0.26∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
7 Limitations 0.27∗ 0.33∗∗∗
8 Limitations 0.00 0.32∗∗∗
Qualifications (ref = high)
High 1.00 1.00
Medium 0.61∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
Low 0.48∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
Age
Age 0.84∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
Constant 23224.76 4275.43 17928.15 4201.14
–2 Log Likelihood 2348.39 28729044.59 2243.00 28037036.95
Nagelkerke R2 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.17
Notes: ∗∗∗ = p < 0.001, ∗∗ = p < 0.01, ∗ = p < 0.05.
Health limitations: sitting for 2 hrs; getting up from a chair; climb several flights of stairs;
stooping/kneeling/crouching; difficulty lift/carry 10 lbs; picking up coin; reaching/extending
arms up; pushing pulling objects.
Wealth equivilised to individual level.
Source: Author’s analysis of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 2002, and the Health
and Retirement Study 2002 (Rand Version F file).
Before we examine the results, it is important to discuss how health and education
are measured. Previous research examining health and employment in older age
often uses the self-reported health ratings of survey respondents, typically ranging
from ‘poor’ to ‘excellent’. Problematically, however, individuals are unlikely to
use consistent criteria for what constitutes ‘poor’ or ‘good’ health (see McNamara
and Williamson, 2004: 269–70).
There are two alternative health measures used in both surveys we can
draw on. First, both surveys ask if respondents have ever been diagnosed with
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a range of medical conditions. Analysis by the author (Lain, 2009: 161–4) has
shown that Americans over 65 were more likely than their English counterparts
to be diagnosed with all of the conditions examined, in some cases by a large
margin. This is consistent with previous research examining people from their
fifties upwards using these surveys (Banks et al., 2006). However, diagnoses may
have been made some time ago, and may not necessarily reflect current physical
work capabilities. In addition, institutional and cultural differences between
healthcare systems in each country may influence the way in which some illnesses
are classified or diagnosed.16
We will use the second measure of health collected in both surveys,
which asks respondents whether they have ‘any difficulties’ doing a range of
everyday activities; the activities selected are listed in the notes to Table 2.
These indicators relate to current problems, and avoid the possible influences
of institutional/cultural differences in healthcare systems. Correspondingly,
differences between countries in reports of difficulties with activities were smaller
than was the case for diagnoses (see Lain, 2009: 162–3). The everyday difficulty
health measure is self-reported, and cannot therefore be considered without
some degree of subjectivity. Crucially, however, there is no reason for assuming
Americans will be more likely to claim difficulties than Britons, all else being equal.
The regression analysis in Table 2 presents health as the number of limitations a
person has.
The educational classification is based on ISCED 97 qualification levels:
• ‘high’, representing degree or above (ISCED 5–6);
• ‘medium’, secondary level to below degree (ISCED 3–4); and
• ‘low’, below secondary (ISCED 0–2).
Qualifications have been allocated as closely as possible to ISCED 97 using
information in OECD (2004c). Slightly fewer Americans were categorised as
being highly educated, compared with OECD (2004c), because the original US
qualifications variable was not sufficiently disaggregated to recode to ISCED 97
exactly (see Lain, 2009: 165). Nevertheless, as in OECD (2004c) the classification
used here found Americans to be more highly educated.17
We now turn to the regression analysis itself. In model 1, we only include
wealth alongside age, as we want to see the influence of these factors before
introducing health and education in model 2. The reference category for wealth
is the richest quintile (quintile 1), so the odds ratio for this group is set to 1.
The odds ratios below this indicate the probability of being in employment
relative to the reference category. We present odds ratios as they are reasonably
straightforward to interpret.
From model 1, we can see that, controlling for age, being in the poorest
quintile reduced the probability of employment in both countries, but to a
greater degree in England. Being in the poorest quintile reduced the probability
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of employment by 73 per cent in England compared with 46 per cent in the USA
(relative to the richest quintile in each country).18 The odds ratios for the middle
three quintiles were closer to 1 in the USA than in England, which reflects the fact
that there was less variation in employment levels across wealth levels.
From model 2, we can see the effect of wealth on employment, once we take
into account the effect of education and wealth. In both countries, the wealth odds
ratio increases between models 1 and 2, indicating that some of the variation in
employment between wealth levels is attributable to health and education. The
odds ratio for the lowest quintile in the United States rises from 0.54 in model
1 to 0.82 in model 2. The fact that the odds ratio moves close to 1 in model
2 suggests that health and education were important in preventing the poorest
from working in the same numbers as the wealthiest. Once we take the effects
of health, education and age into account, being in the poorest quintile only
reduced the probability of being in employment by 18 per cent (relative to the
richest quintile).19 When the poorest had the capacity to work in the USA, they
worked in similar numbers to the richest.
In England, on the other hand, after we take health, education and age into
account, being in the poorest quintile still reduced the probability of working
by more than half (55 per cent).20 This suggests that means-tested benefits did
discourage employment among the poorest in the UK to a degree (otherwise,
we would expect a greater similarity of employment across wealth levels after
accounting for educational and health differences). However, the example of the
USA suggests that any increases in employment amongst the poorest as a result
of removing these benefits would be minimised by the barriers of low levels of
education and health.
Moving on to the odds ratios for health limitations, it is evident that the
probability of working decreased in both countries as the number of health
limitations increased, controlling for other factors. The probability of working
reduced faster in England as the number of health limitations increased, but was
clearly important in reducing the likelihood of working in both countries.
It is interesting that qualifications appear to have a similar impact on
employment in both countries. Taking into account the other factors included,
having low qualifications roughly halves the chances of being in employment
relative to the highly qualified. Likewise, having medium-level qualifications
reduces the probability of employment by around 40 per cent in both
countries.
Conclusion and discussion
American policy encourages individuals to time their retirement according to
their financial needs, and therefore appears to offer attractive solutions to the
problems caused by population ageing and low pension incomes in the UK. In the
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US, employers are forbidden from forcing individuals to retire because of their
age, a move the UK looks increasingly likely to follow, and means-tested benefits
have been severely restricted, reducing incentives to stop working amongst the
poorest.
The much higher level of employment amongst over 65s in the US suggests
that such a policy shift would increase employment amongst this age group in the
UK. However, it is debateable whether these reforms would increase employment
to US levels. Some of the higher US employment rate in the early 2000s can
be attributed to a longer period of labour market demand, and to the lesser
availability of salary-related pensions that encourage earlier retirement.
More fundamentally, there is little evidence that US policies would financially
benefit the poorest. Given the difficulty of obtaining benefits in the US, the
financial consequences of the poorest not working can be harsh. However,
employment rates of the poorest fifth in the US were low, especially when
compared with the wealthiest. Our regression analysis primarily attributes this
to low levels of health and education. Reducing means-tested provision and
strengthening employment protection in the UK would be likely to increase the
employment rates of a relatively small number of poorer people with good health
and reasonable levels of education. This might, for example, include educated
and healthy divorced women with small pensions because of years spent out
of the labour market for family reasons; this is something for future research
to examine. However, the broader and much more significant impact of such
a policy shift would be to damage the overall financial position of the poorest,
as increased employment rates would not come close to compensating for the
decrease in the availability of benefits. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that poverty rates amongst older people were higher in the USA than the UK in the
early 2000s. Poverty rates are high amongst older people in the United Kingdom
too (at around a tenth of the population over 65), but we should not look to
the USA for solutions (where a sixth live in poverty; Smeeding and Sandstro¨m,
2005: 18).
Research suggests that older people want greater choice about retirement
timing (Vickerstaff, 2006a, 2006b; Vickerstaff et al., 2003; Loretto and White,
2006), and a considerable minority of over 65s would like to work (e.g. Smith
2000: 21). Abolishing mandatory retirement ages could play a part in increasing
opportunities for older people to continue working in the UK. It would
enhance employee claims to continued employment and diminish the capacity
of employers to organise their activities on the basis of fixed retirement ages.
However, the consequences for delivering employee choice should not be over-
stated. Those with low retirement incomes who have the capability and desire to
work would continue to be financially penalised by loss of benefits. Addressing
this would require a universal state pension above means-tested levels that could
be taken in full whilst working.
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More broadly, despite greater formal rights to employment, there is evidence
of unmet demand for jobs amongst over 65s in the US. Smith’s (2000: 21) analysis
of the ISSP 1997 Work Orientation Study found that around two fifths of over
65s in the USA stated they would like a job even if they did not need the money,
which is higher than the proportion actually working. Revealingly, Abraham
and Houseman’s (2005) longitudinal analysis of the HRS found that although a
significant minority of older workers planned to reduce their hours or change
jobs prior to, or instead of, retirement, few actually did so. This suggests that
discrimination legislation cannot override the fact that for older people there are
not enough jobs available matching their preferences, skills and experience. The
state therefore has an important responsibility to ensure that pensions provide a
decent standard of living without recourse to earnings.
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Notes
1 By ‘normal’ state pension we mean a pension that has not been reduced as a result of being
taken early, as was possible in the USA (SSA, 2003a: 135). Women in the UK could access
a ‘normal’ state pension at age 60, or defer it until later. In both countries, pension levels
were affected by period of labour market participation.
2 This is based on analysis of pension entitlements of the working-age population in the early
2000s. For people retiring in the UK in 1999, before a change in earnings replacement rate
of SERPs, the equivalent pension income would have been around 27 per cent of average
earnings (author’s estimate based on Whitehouse, 2003). The State Earnings Related Pension
was replaced by the State Second Pension (S2P) in April 2002, which will be more generous
to low earners in the long term (see Agulnik, 1999), but will not remove the need for
means-tested benefits within the system.
3 The exact proportions were 11.7 per cent for the UK and 3.3 per cent for the USA. The
difference between countries was significant at the p = <0.01 level. The author used the
Family Resources Surveys 1999–00, 2000–01, and 2001–02 (combined to increase the sample
size), and the March 2001 Current Population Survey.
4 Calculated by author as maximum income assistance in the UK (OECD, 2004a) and the
USA (SSA, 2003b) as a percentage of average earnings (OECD, 2004d).
5 See the previous note.
6 The exact proportions were 19.1 per cent for the UK and 5.1 per cent for the USA. The
difference between countries was significant at the p = <0.01 level. See endnote 3 for survey
details.
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7 These occupations were ‘basically, airline pilots, fire-fighters and law enforcement officers’
(Macnicol, 2006: 237). Aside from these occupations, people were covered as long as their
employer had 20 or more staff.
8 83.6 per cent at the last census (National Statistics, n.d.). Previous research suggests that
the proportion working past state pension age in England is very marginally higher than
for the UK as a whole (Smeaton and McKay, 2003: 24).
9 This way of identifying employment is likely to include some informal paid work.
10 Pension wealth was excluded given the difficulty discussed above of accurately estimating
deferred pension wealth. The ELSA research team have conducted considerable work to
impute pension wealth for the UK. It is outside the scope of this research project to impute
pension wealth identically for the USA.
11 We focus on men here because female employment rates past 65 are complicated by a general
rise in female labour market participation.
12 These states were Alaska (introducing legislation in 1960), New Jersey (1962), Hawaii (1963),
Maine (1965), Illinois (1967), New Mexico (1969), New Hampshire (1971), Iowa (1972),
Michigan (1972), Nevada (1973), Montana (1974), Connecticut (1975), California (1977),
Florida (1977) and North Carolina (1977). Population coverage calculated from U.S. Bureau
of the Census (1981: 29).
13 Unemployment rates for men were 5.9 per cent in the USA and 5.6 per cent in the UK, and
for women 5.6 per cent in the USA and 4.4 per cent in the UK (OECD, 2003).
14 OECD (2000: 89–90) shows that the sectoral composition of employment in the UK was
very close to that of the US in 1998, with only one other country out of 23 examined
having a more similar labour market (New Zealand). Goods-producing sectors such as
manufacturing, important career employers for older cohorts of men, also represented a
similar share of employment in both countries (26.2 per cent in the UK and 28.6 per cent
in the USA; ibid.: 122).
15 We have comparable data on male unemployment rates from 1970 onwards: 1970: 2.9 per
cent in the UK, 4.1 per cent in the US; 1971: 4 per cent vs. 5.1 per cent; 1972: 4.3 per cent vs.
4.8 per cent; 1973: 3 per cent vs. 4 per cent; 1974 3 per cent vs. 4.7 per cent; 1975: 5.1 per cent
vs. 7.6 per cent; 1976: 6.4 per cent vs. 6.8 per cent; 1977: 6.8 per cent vs. 6.1 per cent; 1978: 6.5
vs. 5.1 per cent; 1979: 5.9 per cent vs. 5 per cent, 1980: 7.5 per cent vs. 6.7 per cent.
16 For example, arthritis diagnoses were much higher in the US, and it may be that American
doctors attribute joint pains to arthritis earlier than English doctors.
17 According to the author’s analysis, 17.8 per cent of Americans past 65 had ‘high’ levels of
education, compared with 6.7 per cent of their English counterparts. The corresponding
figures for ‘medium’ education were 54.8 per cent (USA) and 37.2 per cent (England). Low
educated workers were the remainder (56.1 per cent in the UK, 27.4 per cent in the US).
18 The odds ratio for the poorest quintile in the UK was 0.27, so the probability of being in
employment was reduced by 0.73 (1 – 0.27). Likewise, the odds ratio for the poorest US
quintile was 0.54, so the reduced probability of being in employment was 0.46 (1 – 0.54).
19 The odds ratio for the poorest quintile in the USA in model 2 was 0.82, so the probability
of being in employment was reduced by 0.18 (1 – 0.82).
20 The odds ratio for the poorest quintile in the USA in model 2 was 0.45, so the probability
of being in employment was reduced by 0.55 (1 – 0.45).
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